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AFRICA'S ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION:
ON LEAPFROGGING, LINKAGES AND THE LAW
Maxwell 0. Chibundul
My objective in this essay is to present a model of thinking about Africa's
economic growth (in the parlance of the conference, "reconstruction") that goes
beyond viewing the available options as a binary choice between acceptance of the
tried and true which has failed in the last forty years of tryouts, or a quixotic
theorizing of an ideal that is impracticable within the existing neoliberal (or
neoconservative) models of economic performance that currently superintend the
process that we have all come to know as "globalization." What I want to suggest
and defend is that, without ignoring the failings of the past, African societies can
construct a successful economic future by downplaying their focus on external
economic stimuli, and by paying more attention to local or domestic demands.
I begin with three caveats: First, I'm trained as a lawyer, not as an economist.
Nonetheless, just as war is too important to be left to generals, the primacy of
economic relationships in determining sociopolitical structures implies that the field
cannot be left solely to professional economists. It would be foolhardy, however, if
lay perspectives were to ignore the central tenets of economics as a discipline. I
make my presentation therefore by accepting many of the central tenets of classical
Western economic thought; above all, the relevance of material-based incentives
(and disincentives) as efficient regulators of human behavior - that of the traditional
African, no less than of the North American technophile. Second, although context
matters, there are in truth few situations or societies that are sui generis. All theories
must take account of "facts" on the ground, but the need for particularization is not
an argument against theory nor of the relevance of generalization. I shall therefore
treat Africa as a unit, with the understanding that the continent exhibits a wide range
of variations in the factors that I shall articulate and consider in this presentation.
Third, my intention is not to prescribe specific policies. We have neither the time
nor I the competence to do so. My goal is to present perspectives that if employed
by policymakers should lead to optimal prescriptions, and if properly implemented
might yield better economic performance.
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Against the backdrop of these caveats, I shall, in what follows: (1) delineate four
elements that I view as central to gauging Africa's economic reconstruction; (2)
describe and evaluate three paradigms of economic growth; and (3) inquire into the
relevance of law for the economic reconstruction project.

I. WHAT ISECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION
During the last ten years, the Republic of South Africa has stood out as a beacon
of hope in the "dark" continent. It's been flashed as an exemplar of effective conflict
resolution, of negotiated peaceful transition from an abhorrent past to a promisefilled future, of toleration, forgiveness, nonracialism, and of course "democracy". In
short, South Africa has been a poster society for the civic virtues of contemporary
liberalism in the sociopolitical spheres.
Without detracting from any of these strengths, it is worth pointing out that
conspicuous by their absence from this list are matters related to economic wellbeing. Their omission may reflect the basic fact that the radical political
transformations in the South African polity have not been mirrored in the economic
structures of the society, or perhaps it is a reflection of the now standard approach
among international opinion-makers of emphasizing civil and political developments
in the nonwestem world over economic development (except, of course, where such
developments seem to threaten directly economic well-being in the West, as in
Mexico in 1994-95, South-East Asia in 1997, or Russia in 1998). But whatever may
be the reason, it offers to South African society the challenge and opportunity of
stepping down from the pedestal in which it has been perched in order to try to make
common cause with its regional neighbors. In consonant with this hope, I shall
approach the issue of economic reconstruction not from the perspective of how
South Africa can lead the rest of the continent - whether by example or by
investment - but how the entire continent, working individually and collaboratively,
should think through and adopt policies that promote the economic welfare of their
societies.
The success of economic reconstruction, I'd like to suggest, must be measured
along four dimensions. The first and most common of those yardsticks is the
accumulation of material assets. The traditional evaluation of economic well-being
typically has focused on this measure of economic welfare. Such aggregates as gross
domestic product, per capita income, trade, investment and foreign exchange
balances, all highlight this feature of undifferentiated collective welfare. Indeed, in
the United States, the "law and economics" school of thought has vulgarized the idea
of economics as amounting to no more than "wealth maximization".
There is no denying that asset accumulation whether by the individual or by the
state is critical to economic welfare. The capacity of a society, like that of an
individual, to engage meaningfully and fruitfully in intercourse depends on the
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resources available for exchange to that society. African states have performed
miserably in accumulating and holding unto exchangeable assets, and while the
Republic of South Africa is certainly much better off in this area than virtually any
other African society, its aggregate exchangeable wealth still falls below those that it
needs or considers as adequate for its welfare. This shortcoming, like that of the rest
of the continent, is particularly glaring when viewed against the backdrop of the
other indicia of economic well-being.
The second of those gauges of economic welfare relates to the distribution
within a society of the accumulated wealth of the society. The importance of this
consideration as a factor of economic welfare was the primary contribution of the
McNamara-led World Bank in the 1970s. The so-called "Gini coefficient," which
seeks to measure the parity of income distribution within a society, was introduced
as a prescriptive tool for gauging economic development by "progressive
economists" to challenge the then prevailing orthodoxy that economic growth should
be measured solely in terms of increases in the aggregate accumulation of wealth.
By demonstrating that the fast-growing economies of East Asia also exhibited
remarkably low inequality of income distribution, these economists contended that
not only should countries aim for aggregate increases in economic welfare, but that
by adopting policies that promoted fairer income distribution, they were also aiding
high economic growth.
But there were theoretical and philosophical difficulties with this prescription.
On the theoretical side, there were no adequate explanations within the framework of
orthodox liberal macroeconomics of the claimed observed relationship between
relative income equality and aggregate growth. Might not the relationship be
fortuitously coincidental rather than causal? And if the relationship did in fact exist,
wouldn't the mandating of policies that reduced income inequality - whatever its
benefits might be for aggregate growth - undercut some of the tenets of the liberal
political order such as individual autonomy and democratic governance? Indeed,
those East Asian societies that simultaneously exhibited relative income equality and
high economic growth (notably Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore)
manifested such tendencies as "clientelism," "authoritarianism" and "administrative
paternalism"; features that were not synonymous with liberal democracy. And in
any event, the promotion of "income equality" as an ideal came close to endorsing
"socialism," if not "communism."
The result was that "progressive economists" of the 1970s who espoused "fair
income distribution" as essential to economic growth contented themselves with a
modified objective to equitable redistribution: the so-called "basic needs" approach.
Rather than seeking to sell an economic policy that squarely confronted the problem
of income inequality, it was sufficient that such policy asked whether minimum
"caloric intake" was assured to the population at large. Beyond this minimum, a
society wishing to engage in rapid economic growth could strive for aggregate
increase in assets without worrying about distribution. This doctrine remains 'alive
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today, except that rather than worrying about individual caloric intakes, the new
international (finance-led) order seeks to do away with poverty through such
"communitarian" institutions as "micro credit" rather than the individualized
"minimum caloric intake" formula.
The third yardstick for measuring a country's economic well-being relates to the
allocation of resources within a national economy. If we assume that there is a
rational relationship between resource allocation and resource derivation (an
assumption supported by the "efficiency" hypothesis in classical economic theory),
then economic welfare is best served by devoting national resources to those areas of
economic activity that would generate the highest returns for each marginal input.
Because developing economies tend to be relatively small open economies that are
"price takers," they are better off with diversified economies capable of weathering
changing patterns of tastes and preferences, rather than as monocultural economies,
even if the relevant single product happens to be, at a given time, in considerable
demand. National economies that allocate a preponderant amount of their resource
towards product diversification (a feature characteristic of industrialization) rather
than in extracting a single product (however richly the country may be endowed with
the product) are likely to realize faster economic growth. This idea has always been
controversial, and although it did win Sir Arthur Lewis a Nobel prize for Economics,
it has gained acceptance at best only at the margins of orthodox neoclassical
economics. Indeed, the idea is frequently in tension with that pillar of liberal
economics: "comparative advantage."
Finally, a fourth measure of national economic welfare is what might be referred
to as "self-sustaining growth." It is the least developed in traditional economic
theory of the gauges, yet its centrality and relevance cannot be gainsaid. All
economies are subject to the dislocations caused by changes in tastes, preferences,
resource endowments and technologies. A measure of economic welfare is the
capacity of a country to weather effectively the dislocations that arise. That capacity
determines whether the dislocations are merely temporary, or whether they result in a
vicious cycle of downtrodden poverty. The capacity to bounce back from inevitable
dislocations as a result of national political and economic decisions, rather than on
the basis of handouts from others, is thus a significant measure of economic strength.
There is, for example, little doubt today that many of the South-East Asian
economies will readily satisfy the first three gauges of economic growth delineated
above. How well they can satisfy the fourth remains open, although Malaysia's
ability to weather the 1997-1998 crisis in a manner no worse than others despite
adopting its own independent policies (and in the teeth of strenuous opposition from
the established international financial institutions and treasuries of North America
and Western Europe) augurs well for the so-called "newly industrialized economies"
on this criterion.
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The reconstruction of Africa's economies, then, must embody means that permit
and encourage the integration of policies that promote asset accumulation with
effective income distribution, product diversification and the capacity for internallygenerated economic renewal. To explore the forms such policies might take, I'll
describe and evaluate three approaches that one can glean from extant literature. I'll
then offer a modified perspective on these approaches.
II. PARADIGMS OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCrION
In one form or another, all humanistic disciplines face a truism that academic
philosophy has tried to make a virtue of: "There are no new questions nor answers,
just new ways of framing them." This is certainly the case in the matter of
comprehending the problem of and prescribing the cure for Africa's economic
underperformance over the last half-century. Wrestling with this issue gave rise to
and informed a discipline that has waxed and waned multiple times during this
period - "Development Studies." In what follows, I shall borrow from the
paradigms of the discipline as a means of navigating through what are, at best,
stormy waters. In presenting the teachings of economic development, below, I hope
to (I) draw attention to the magnitude of the challenge one faces in synthesizing the
problem; (ii) illuminate the thoughtfulness that has already gone into evaluating and
prescribing potential solutions; (iii) demonstrate the continuing inadequacy of our
understanding (or, perhaps of the intractability) of the problem which is manifested
by the poverty of the results we've obtained so far; and (iv) reflect on the cost and
benefit of our persistent doggedness in viewing the problem in terms of externallydriven capital accumulation and internally promoted distribution of resources. I
shall suggest that while the development paradigms rightly are concerned with
measuring and improving material welfare, the time horizon of the focus of inquiry
on which they've been constructed have skewed the relevant data, and, of course, the
accompanying prescriptions. What may be needed more than carefully constructed
paradigms or practical plans, may be the willingness to accept unpalatable truths in
the short-run, while refraining from the constant midstream corrections that is
entailed in the theorizing of these paradigms and their implementing plans over a
short period of time.

A. Stages of Development
As a prelude to the normative discussion of current reconstruction programs typified by the trilaterally proposed "Millennium African Recovery Plan" of
Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflicker/Waad - I'd like to take a few moments
to present a sketch of prior efforts at economic reconstruction. In describing those
efforts, my primary purpose is to make explicit the historical backdrop that informs
the tone that I take in appraising current reconstruction projects.
While
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generalization is unavoidable, I intend to limit the level of abstraction to that
necessary for the arguments and proposals that I submit.
The current proclamation of an African "renaissance" is easily one of many such
proclaimed resurgences in barely a generation. By my count, it represents a fifth
demarcation point within this brief time-span. As I shall describe below, these
phases while having distinct attributes, have shared transcendent philosophies. The
phases, for ease of reference, I shall call the "international," the "National," the
"African," the "global," and the "Millennial." With the exception of the last which
is still very much unfolding and unfocused, each of these phases was typified by a
reasonably well developed point of view that embraced much of the continent during
its ascendancy, lasted for about a decade, and then withered away, to be replaced by
another which, superficially, appeared to constitute a break with the prior orthodoxy.
As I shall argue later, this mirage of fleeting changes of policy has substantial costs
for the project of economic reconstruction.
1. The International Phase
The "winds of change" that swept through Africa between 1955-1965 (to select
two reasonable dates) was generally welcomed within and without the continent as
the beginning of positive processes in the economic and political lives of African
societies. The basic belief was that Africans, having retrieved their political
independence from their colonial rulers, were bound to implement policies that
assured the economic welfare of the continent. As Kwame Nkrumah, one of the
more charismatic of those African leaders, framed the rallying cry: "seek ye first the
political kingdom, and all else will be yours."
No one doubted the success of Africa's economic transformation from agrarian
subsistence (the perpetuation of which was generally assumed to be the product of
exploitative colonialism) to modem industrial societies. Rather, the debate revolved
around whether the transformation would come about through spontaneously ordered
natural evolution (albeit compressed into a very short period of time), said to be
characteristic of the West European and North American experiences, or via
government-sponsored central planning which characterized Soviet economics.
African leaders temporized. Perhaps they had no choice, but more about that later.
With virtually no exception, independent Africa absorbed (or more accurately
was absorbed into) the economic structures in place at the twilight of colonial rule.
These reflected essentially the mix of market and state institutions that had become
the norm in Post world War II Europe. Most transactions were governed by market
determined prices; and this was true with regard to both internal and external trade.
Internal transactions manifested a pronounced dichotomy between the "modem
sector," located primarily in islands of urban settlements, and the "traditional sector,"
characterized by subsistence activities. External trade followed patterns established
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under colonial rule. Raw materials (both agricultural and mineral) were extracted
from the hinterlands and exported to Europe and North America in exchange for
manufactured goods and financial investments.
Integral to the functioning of the market was an activist role for the state. Much
of that role was inherited from the departing colonial government. Not only did the
existence of a sizeable (and for all practical purposes unionized) civil service have a
direct bearing on the price of labor within the fairly small modem sector, but the
government was an active participant in the provision of such overarching social
services as health, education, insurance, transportation and, to a lesser extent,
consumer banking. In addition, the state frequently spearheaded the creation of
"marketing boards" and other cooperative organizations that streamlined the
exploitation of those primary products that constituted the basic exports of the
national economy.
In these transactions, two points should be stressed. First and foremost, the
government (and by extension the state) functioned, primarily, not as a dispassionate
regulator or arbiter of competing interests, but as one among many participants in an
essentially market-based economic system. As such, the government, as a
participant, no more than the private individual was a price-taker in these
transactions. Its size occasionally may have affected the price on offer in the
domestic market, but it was the "market" rather than governmental dictate that was
the ultimate arbiter of the terms of exchange. Second, this role was not the
consequence of a revolutionary moment of political independence, nor of an
indigenous African response to the internationalization of their economic lives.
Rather, post-colonial African societies were simply embracing institutions and
practices that were bequeathed to them by the departing colonial administrators.
This is not to argue that the post-independent African state was nonregulatory,
or that there were no African contributions to the post-colonial economic structures
of these societies. The promulgation of laws is uniquely a state function, and
independent African governments undertook this task with zest. They passed laws
on currency exchange rates, tax holidays for pioneer industries, customs tariffs,
foreign investments, development plans and the like. The "development plans," of
course frequently took account (at least in theory) of the level of the economic
attainment of the particular society, as well as of its aspirations. Thus, whether it
was a four or a five year development plan, the amount of resources that would be
devoted to tertiary education, health-care, beer brewing, or cement manufacturing,
reflected local conditions. But these were arguments over issues of degree, not of
kind.
But to say that the institutions of economic relations were unchanged following
political independence is not to assert that interests and ideas remained the same. To
the contrary. If political independence meant anything, it was the superseding of one
group of elites by another. Although, for the most part, Oxford and Sorbonne trained
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civil servants were replaced by G.C.E. and I.B. wielding bureaucrats, the privileged
status of the latter group in their newly independent societies was no less pronounced
than that which the former had enjoyed in theirs. Similarly, in the private sector, it
was often the concerns of the politically active and highly mobilized unionized
white-collar workers in the service sectors of the economy (notably, banking,
insurance and transportation) and those of professionals such as teachers, lawyers
and doctors, that dictated governmental policy. The means to the satisfaction of the
interests of these groups only reinforced the institutional structures in existence at the
decolonizing moment. Essentially, those means required subsidization of the
modern sectors of the economy through relatively relaxed import regimes, the
encouragement of foreign investments, and otherwise outward looking economic
policies.
But these were not sufficient conditions for stellar economic performance. In
the first place, an import-oriented regime could be sustained only as long as the
country could generate the requisite foreign currency with which to finance the
imports. The combination of the export of raw materials, the inflow of investment
capital, and of foreign aid proved to be insufficient to meet the foreign currency
demands imposed by the initial economic policies of most African countries. Here,
ideology intervened to make a virtue of what otherwise was probably a necessity:
increasingly, an inward-looking development policy.
2. Nationalism as Economic Development
By 1970, it was evident that for Africa, political independence was not
tantamount to economic over achievement. Despite the adoption of the outwardlooking trade and investment policies referred to above, the declaration of the 1960s
as an international development decade by the United Nations, and the extensions of
significant economic aid to the continent (from the West as readily as from the East),
African countries could show, at best, that their economic performance kept abreast
of the immediate needs of their populations; in other words, that they had not
retrogressed. The elites who had been the beneficiaries of the outward orientation of
economic policies, as much as the general population were restive. While
particularized political and cultural factors can be advanced in individual cases to
explain the raft of military coup d'etats and dictatorial one-party (or, more
accurately, "one-person") regimes that flourished in the continent between 19651995, it's impossible to overstate the significance of economic underperformance to
the continent's overall political instability during the period. The new military
governments invariably sought to legitimize their successful coups by pointing to the
obvious mismanagement of the economy by the overthrown government, while the
one-person ruler explained his abortion of the fledgling democratic institutions by
explaining that the amorphousness of the accountability (or lack of it) inherent in
those institutions rendered the pursuit of national economic goals overly costly.
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Coincidentally, the benevolent international economic environment of the 1960s
gave way in the 1970s to a quite inhospitable one. The economies of the West were
buffeted by hitherto unthinkable rises in the price of core raw materials, notably
crude oil, copper, aluminium and uranium. The Western economies (especially the
United States), responded not by decreasing their demand for this raw materials, but
by increasing their money-supply with which to acquire the raw materials. The
result was both the stagnation of western economies as well as rampant inflation;
what came to be known as stagflation. In such an environment, the concerns in the
West of Africa's economic plight could at best be secondary. Of course, the West
(especially Western Europe) did not (and probably could not) completely disengage
from concerns over Africa. Yet, it displayed no special solicitude for Africa's
particular problems. Thus, much of the aid that Africa received in the 1970's and
1980's was channelled through such multilateral arrangements as the Lome
Convention, and various special and enhanced facilities at the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
The relative disinterest of the West in Africa's economic situation in the 70's
and 80's was doubtless influenced in no small part by the attitude of African
governments. Not only were these governments increasingly a mockery of the
western democratic institutions that the departed colonizers thought they had
bequeathed as lasting legacies of their civilizing missions, but the rhetoric in
justification of these parodies were often borrowed wholesale from western classical
thought, and often assigned blame and guilt to the West. Thus, many of the new
African governments asserted as policy (even if they rarely practiced) the right to
nationalize their economies through such measures as state ownership of the modem
sectors of the economy, expropriation of foreign investments in the sector, the right
to the unilateral determination of what constitutes appropriate compensation in such
cases, the unilateral readjustment of tariffs notwithstanding bindings under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the right to form cartels and to limit
the quantity and price at which products extracted from their territories can be
offered for sale. In response to the criticism that such policies violated the basic
tenets of the international economic system, African governments, like many others
in the so-called "developing world," invoked the principles of "self-determination"
and of "national sovereignty," concepts that had been articulated and extensively
developed by the enlightenment thinkers of the West and their twentieth century
disciples.
Despite the nationalist rhetoric, and the occasional transformation of that
rhetoric into policy, the new economic policies pursued by the African governments
left the continent just as reliant on the twists and turns of international trade and
investment as had the prior policies of the internationalist phase. What changed was
not the type and direction of trade and investment flows, but who, ostensibly,
directed and controlled their reception. Where large multinational corporations,
managed from abroad or by non-African expatriates, and responsive only to
governmental incentives, previously had essentially dictated capital inflows, such
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inflows were now directed by many of the same multinationals, but now ostensibly
under the control of local indigenous managers, and in response to more or less
direct governmental edicts.
Similarly, many of the export and import decisions which hitherto had been
made by Lebanese and Asian entrepreneurs were ostensibly transferred, through the
so-called indiginization programs, to the emerging African bourgeoisie. But there is
little evidence that, aside from enriching the African middle-class, these localization
policies effectively changed the path of African economic development. That
development was still very much oriented towards trade with the West; and, by and
large, African economies remained price-takers, with the determinants of their
economic performance dependent more on demand factors in the West than on any
of these domestic policies.
3. The Africanist Decade
The nationalist phase may have failed in reorienting the focus of African trade
and investment policies, but it resulted in the reduction of the inflows, and it diverted
much of those inflows from private to public sources. Risk-averse foreign investors,
confronted by the uncertainties of the rhetoric of nationalization, and facing fierce
competition in their stagnating inflation-prone home markets, undertook investments
in African economies only with great reluctance. It was this period that gave birth to
the reemergence of the swashbuckling entrepreneurial ruthless western investor, such
as "Tiny" Roland of Lonrho, rather than the staid multinational (such as Unilever) as
the prototype of the Western investor in Africa. The result was the diminution of
capital inflows.
Of no less significance was the diversionary consequences of African
nationalism and Western stagflation. International financial institutions, notably the
World bank, under the direction of Robert McNamara, found in the financing of
basic infrastructural programs such as the construction of schoolhouses, roads and
pipeborne water, a new raison d'etre, and many western governments sought to
address the demand problems of their stagnating economies through extensive shortterm export credit financing. Interestingly, then, while much of the world in the
second-half of the 1970s financed their capital flows through private debt
accumulation, most African countries accumulated their debt from public sources.
As I shall explain below, this difference in the sources of debt financing has been
significant in shaping the current approaches to Africa's economic reconstruction.
However, as the 1970s drew to a close, it was the decline in overall capital inflows
rather than the source of capital that was crucial in framing the third African
response to the problem of economic reconstruction.
That response was typified in what was known as the "Lagos Plan of Action."
In 1980, African leaders, gathered in the then Nigerian capital, articulated for the
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economic arena the goal of an integrated continent. Economic policies, henceforth,
were to be underpinned by a preference for promoting transcontinental trade and
investment flows: an objective that was seen as necessary if the ultimate dream of
continent-wide political unity was to be achieved.
It is probably the case that having a formal plan of action spurred some
transcontinental economic activities. Government-controlled airlines, for example,
did restructure some of their routes so that in other to get to Abidjan from Lagos, one
did not first have to fly to London or Paris. And one of my treasured musical
recordings is that of a Nigerian High Life band whose compact disc was made not in
New York or London, but in Dakar, Senegal. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the
Lagos Plan failed to generate any noticeable growth in Africa's economies. Putting
aside the question of sincerity (that is, whether there was ever a genuine commitment
to its implementation, or whether it was intended from the outset as no more than
political theatre), the project was doomed from inception for a variety of structural
reasons.
In the first place, the timing could not have been more inauspicious. The 1980s
was, for Africa more than even for Latin America, a lost decade. The radical
reduction of the demand for raw materials in Europe and North America, the
instabilities of the international financial system, persistent poor weather in much of
the African continent, political instability, and outright continued mismanagement of
the economy meant that the usual scarcities that Africans had come to learn to live
with, were aggravated by conditions that were at times unimaginable. The Ethiopian
and Sahel famines, products as much of political upheavals as of natural forces run
amoc, were only the best recorded of a pervasive problem. Thus, even hitherto
touted successes like Kenya and Cote d'lvoire, to name two examples, did not escape
the impoverization and outright immiseration of the continent. In a climate of
desperate scarcity, national governments were more worried about survival than
about promoting a continental dream. Far from co-operating with one another, it
became quite routine practice when the going got tough to blame tight economic
circumstances on the sojourning nationals of other African countries, and to expel
those foreign nationals as a means of buying domestic peace.
This last point reveals another fundamental structural flaw in the Lagos Plan.
Like the other economic policies already discussed in this talk, its primary (perhaps
indeed only) focus was on the "modem" sector of the economy. The Plan focused
exclusively on how to promote trade and related exchange transactions between
African countries. It was silent on the internal restructuring of domestic economies,
and statements as to the coordination and harmonization of policies were framed in
terms of the external sector. The idea of economic reconstruction was seen primarily
as the task of the elite, not of the nation as a whole.
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4.

Globalism

In 1989, the world Bank published what has attained the status of a seminal
work on Africa's economic development: "Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for
Development". The work was notable because, compared to the usual obfuscatory
bureaucratese and diplomatic hedging for which the work products of the institution
were (and for the most part still are) renowned, the Report's articujation of its
diagnosis of Africa's economic ailments and the prescribed cures were quite
straightforward. Starting with the thunderclap of pointing out that a continent with
six hundred million people had a gross product barely that of a small European
country, Belgium, with one-sixtieth of its population, and that the continent's gross
product was in 1989, just about what it had been two decades earlier, the Report
argued that African governments were primarily culpable for this dismal state of
affairs. The basic problem, the report suggested, was that the African state, as an
institution, had become an overgrown parasite, that engulfed most other institutions
within society, and in the process enfeebled growth. The suggested cure was the
reduction of the size of the state in the economic life of the nation.
This prescription was one that conveniently coincided with the emerging
neoliberal orthodoxy in Western Europe and North America, and of the International
Monetary Fund. The idea that private actors, "incentivized" by the market shorn of
state intervention, were the engines of growth was of course the dominant theology
of the late 1980s and 1990s. In order to have the large public debts that African
countries had accumulated in the 1970s and 1980s rescheduled or written off, or if
these countries were to continue receiving foreign assistance and investments, their
governments had to liberate their private sectors. Specifically, through "structural
adjustment programs," they had to reduce the role of the state by, among other
things, privatizing parastatals, reducing the number of civil servants in their
employment, adopting more flexible exchange rate policies, removing price controls,
reducing subsidies on middle-class consumer items, and reducing tariffs on imports.
Despite protests from labor unions, some academics and nongovernmental
organizations, most African governments, given their dependency on foreign credit,
had little choice in the matter, and had to capitulate to the preconditions for foreign
assistance. For many, the otherwise unpalatable choices conveniently could be
rendered less so by being combined with the changing political stance on democratic
rule. In other instances, the need for such policies precipitated or quickened the
death of moribund gerentocracies, "one-party rule," and military dictatorships.
Thus, as we went through the 1990s, Africa reappeared as a participant in the
global economy, whose policies were animated by and responsive to the same
network of influences as elsewhere in the capitalist world economy. Much of Africa
may lack the proliferation of the infrastructural networks of fiber optic cables,
computers, geostationary satellites, and cellular 'phone towers that are the hallmarks
of the new information technology age, but no one doubts that Africans are entitled
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to these accoutrements of our global civilization, and that, in due course, they will
receive them. For African leaders of the 1990s, the question was not (as it had been
for much of the 1970s and 1980s) whether Africans successfully could go it alone,
but rather, how African economies could benefit most from an integrated world
economy.
4. The Millennium Recovery project
The "Millennium Africa Recovery Plan," spearheaded by President Tabo
Mbeki, and anchored in its supports by Presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflicker must
be viewed and appraised against the backdrop of what has preceded. From what I've
said thus far, it should be obvious that thinking about coordinated continent-wide
rebirth has a decent pedigree. Thus far, the Millennium Plan lacks details, but
enough has been said in news reports to suggest its probable course: at least enough
of a sketch to permit it being placed in context with the previous reconstruction
projects.
Judging by the newspaper stories, the MARP, at least for our purposes, has two
noteworthy and overarching features. First, it recognizes "good governance" as
integral to economic reconstruction. And "democratic rule" appears to be a
necessary condition for "good governance," with the two terms sometimes being
used as synonyms. The obvious underlying logic is that African leaders, as
economic decision-makers, ought to be made accountable for their decisions, and
that democratic rule provides the optimal means of assuring such accountability.
Second, the engine for economic growth lies in market-oriented reforms of national
economies. Specifically, the privatization of national economies, flexible labor laws,
and of course attracting foreign investments into the continent. To create the
requisite climate for the obvious need for capital accumulation demands, in addition
to good governance, functioning markets and effective enforcement of commercial
laws.
It is obvious, then, that proponents of the MARP intend to build on the
globalism of the 1990s by replacing an externally imposed adjustment program with
a "home grown" one. Remarkably, however, the least talked-about aspects of the
plan relate to the internal dynamics of the economic contents of the Plan. We know
that an objective of the plan is to encourage foreign investment inflows into the
continent by encouraging democratic rule. But what role does internal economic
restructuring play in the process? What are the sources of specific elements of the
plan? Who are drafting its terms? What coordination mechanisms, if any, does the
plan envisage both within national economies and across the continent? Will the
plan consist of general principles available to be adopted at the whim of each
country, or will there be some institutionalized means for marketing, enforcing and
evaluating its results? In short, when it comes to issues related to what makes the
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plan "African," none of the news stories provide much meaningful information; nor
is it clear that the authors of the plan have thought through these issues.
What I've just done, of course, is to posit in rhetorical form a basic theme that
has informed much of this presentation. Africa's economic reconstruction projects,
as I hope that I've succeeded in demonstrating thus far, are notable for their outward
focus. Those who shape these policies appear to pay virtually no attention to the
enabling internal dynamics of these policies. In what follows, I shall argue that this
shortcoming, shared by all of the five approaches that I've discussed (including the
ostensibly "national" and "African") constitutes a significant defect in the
Continent's approach to economic reconstruction. Further, I shall contend not only
that if the Millennium plan is to fare any better than its predecessors, it must
incorporate an inward focus as much as an outward one, but that such incorporation
must be the basic foundation for any reconstruction project. I shall begin by positing
three paradigms of development, and then go on to explain the relevance of these
paradigms for contemporary economic reconstruction plans.
B. Leapfrogging or Linkage?
An ancient debate in "development studies" revolves around whether economic
growth should be seen as a disciplined evolutionary march in which, in order to get
to Point C from Point A, one must necessarily go through Point B, or whether growth
is an asynchronous process that is particularistic, and about which rules can only be
framed in sui generis terms.
Although few persons today are brave or intellectually suicidal enough to
articulate the former position in as deterministic a fashion as it was once done in
professor
Rostow's work on "The Stages of Economic Growth," the idea of viewing and
representing economic growth as a linear progressive process with identifiable and
readily recognizable demarcation points continues to have much sway in both
academic and policy circles. And, indeed, the process of industrialization by which
manufacturing technology starts out in the very capital rich economies, and migrates
sequentially to the capital rich and only finally to the capital poor is often taken as
confirmation of the "stages of growth" thesis. Similarly, the tendency to think of
capital accumulation in such phases as raw materials extraction giving rise to import
substitution which leads to export processing and terminates in service-induced
technological innovations suggest the deep-seated place the "stages of development"
theory has come to occupy in even the most mundane of our thoughts about growth.
It is fair to say that the "stages of growth" thesis did not find hospitable
reception
in post-independent Africa. For African policy-makers, the theory was
seen not only as suggesting temporal backwardness, but also was viewed as dooming
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the continent to a perpetual game of trying to catch-up, with the likelihood of doing
so to be measured in generations, if not centuries.
The responses of these policy-makers, however, cannot fairly be characterized
as an antithesis to the stages of growth theory. That response, essentially, was to
argue that African growth, rather than having to proceed in a sequential line, could
"leap-frog" over some of the stages that European societies may have gone through.
It may therefore be possible for an African economy that was characterized by a
regime of feudal land-tenure and subsistence agriculture to become an industrial
manufacturer of goods without first having to be stymied for a prolonged period in
the petty bourgeois capital accumulation phase of growth. But this argument for the
possible short-circuiting of some of the phases of growth, it should be noted, was not
a rejection of the thesis. Indeed, many of the policies pursued by African
governments (and reviewed above) implicitly accepted the stages of growth thesis.
The outward focus of those policies at their core, was an effort to substitute the
demand for internally generated capital (the primary role of the petty bourgeois
phase) with imported capital. One might ask the extent to which the failure of these
policies are indicative of the futility of this substitution approach? In other words,
was the failure one that is systemic to the stages of growth theory, or did it simply
suggest that the inadequacies of the various implementing modifications to the
theory? I shall return to this issue shortly. But before doing so, I want to offer a
competing paradigm for economic reconstruction.
If a historically determined sequential approach to growth constituted one
paradigm of economic growth, a socio-cultural orientation was a distinctive
alternative. Here, economic growth could be viewed as an integral aspect of social
formation. For African societies, the path to economic development would lie in
policies that sought to exploit the internal dynamics of their societies. Such policies
would focus on establishing and, more importantly, furthering linkages among
seemingly asymmetrical institutions and practices within society: between the
modern and the traditional, the urban and the rural, the industrial and the agricultural,
the social and the economic. Growth would be evaluated less in terms of material
accumulation, and more on the basis of the harmonious relationships forged among
members of the society.
I think this was the paradigm that underpinned Tanzania's "Ujamaa" program.
But, for a variety of reasons, the paradigm has not received anywhere near the sort of
attention that the stages of growth paradigm has. For one thing, its results are not
quite as easily quantifiable (at least in our bureaucratized world) as is the
measurement of materially-based asset accumulation. Similarly, the absence of an
exchange mechanism for valuing the results renders it virtually impossible to make
intersocietal comparisons, and therefore to engage in any normative evaluation of the
results. And, in the absence of a normative evaluation, who is to prescribe the
continuation or rejection of a policy? Scholars and policy-makers are bound,
therefore, to dismiss such policies either as impossibly incommensurable or
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"utopian." We therefore gauge the success of Tanzania's Ujamaa, not by inquiring
into the social or political stability that it may have generated for that society, but by
asking the extent to which it promoted per capita income, and how that increase in
income (or lack of it), compares with the performance of other societies.

But arguing that the problem with a linkages-based paradigm may be one of
measurement rather than of effect is not an adequate response to a critique of that
paradigm. Technically valid as such a response might be, the reality is that the
beneficiaries of such policies inhabit a world in which commensurability and
comparisons are as much elements of what constitutes the good life as is any sense of
internal peace and happiness. Tanzanians, no less than Nigerians or South Africans,
are interested in quantifying their happiness and measuring it against those of other
people. Their sense of personal worth is, like that of much of humanity, is gauged by
them not only in terms of their absolute wealth, measured in material terms, but of
how that wealth compares or contrasts to those possessed by others.
It will not do, then, to suggest that the shortfalls of Africa's embrace of the
stages of growth approach can be corrected by adopting the linkages paradigm. And
if one rejects both paradigms, what alternatives exist? I shall respond to this
question by positing a third paradigm of economic reconstruction.
C. Leapfrogging Over Linkages
From what I've said so far, one might think that the resolution of Africa's
economic difficulties would lie in hybridizing elements of the two paradigms to form
a new one, and were we in a fantasy world, that might well be right. In one sense,
that is what African governments tried to do under the auspices of the Lagos Plan of
Action. But the practical problem raised by any hybrid theory is the identification of
the transplantable elements that will cohere and complement. The failure of the
Lagos Plan demonstrates that this is no small difficulty. The "nationalistic"
tendencies of African leaders, honed by decades of rhetoric, and the tendency to
believe that economic growth was necessarily a product of external trade and
investments, led them to articulate a "linkage" policy that embraced trans-African
trade as the path to future growth. But the policy failed in part because the products
of the economies did not permit complementary exchanges. One society did not
possess abundant financial capital and the other abundant raw material, nor one
society excessive technology and the other oversupply of labor - to resort to
elementary illustrations. Rather than hybridization, what I want to suggest is a
reconceptualization of one of the paradigms; that is, an approach that, rather than
trying to identify elements of strengths from diverse sources and then coalescing
those elements into a unitary process, simply takes one of the two paradigms, with
all of its elements and flaws, and asks whether the problem lies less in the elements
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of the paradigm than in the way we've come to view the salient features of the
paradigm.
It is perhaps possible that one can arrive at the same results regardless of which
of the two paradigms one undertakes to restructure, but because of the problem of
measurement that one encounters with the "linkages" paradigm, and given the
greater familiarity in intellectual and policy circles with the "stages of growth"
theory, I shall employ the latter as the preferred paradigm to be reconstructed. I shall
suggest that its utility for Africa's economic reconstruction lies not with the ways
that African governments had tried to use (or abuse) its insights, but in the
overlooked possibilities of the theory. The problem has been one of omission; of
ignoring issues that are closer to home and about which African societies can do a lot
to shape, while seeking salvation in far-away lands, and in policies that usually
meaningfully are beyond the capacity of most African countries to determine.
A common attribute of the various economic policies that African governments
have pursued in the interest of growth is that they've all been directed at influencing
supply. These policies have sought foreign investment primarily to increase the
production capacities of the economy, whether of raw materials or of manufactured
goods. Similarly, the focus of tax policies, of import substitution, of export
promotion, and even of currency devaluations have been framed in terms of
supporting aggregate increases in supply. The underlying justification, of course, is
that increased production translates into increased employment and increased wealth
- personal and national. In this understanding of economics, African governments
are by no means unique. And in the success of the export-led economies of East
Asia, one frequently finds vindication for this classical view. And, as long as the
"follow the successful leader" ethos dictates national economic policies, there is little
reason to believe that this supply-based approach to economic growth will be
abandoned any time in the near future. This will be so even though it is clear that a
supply orientation works only for as long as there are willing and unsatiated
consumers with the wealth to engage in consumption, and that the idea of "free
trade" notwithstanding, the wealthy economies of the "West" or "North" will permit
imports only as long and in such quantities as influential domestic constituencies
permit.
But is it possible that the path to economic reconstruction lies less with
satisfying externally-generated demand than in understanding and meeting domestic
demand? I want to suggest that this is an aspect of economic growth to which
African governments have paid virtually no attention. Of course, when buffeted by
episodic events such as union demonstrations over the shortage or price of gasoline,
bread, cornmeal or rice, African governments have been forced to take palliative
measures to address the emergency. It is the exceptional case where such
governments have engaged in sustained and systematic efforts at understanding and
addressing domestic demand. Annual national budgets do routinely proclaim how
much the government intends to spend on such matters as health, education,
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agriculture, transportation, electric, other infrastructure and the like. Yet, these
figures often represent little more than accounting entries; expressions of intent or
interest that are rarely backed by hard information, nor subjected to serious
retrospective review. Any scrutiny of these annual budgets easily disclose that to the
extent one is presented with hard figures, they are culled from the external trade
sector of the economy. Thus, the proportion of the national economy that will be
devoted to servicing external debt is usually spelled out with precision; the amount
that will be devoted to internal debt less so. Policies on interest rates are usually
explained more in terms of exchange rate valuations than in terms of stimulating or
repressing internal demand. Indeed, monetary policy, to the extent one can identify a
consistent policy as such, is almost always defined with reference to the pull of
external commitments than of internal demands.
Part of the explanation for these divergences doubtless lies in the comparative
availability of or access to relevant data. It is an unhappy fact that, with regard to
virtually any given African country, credible data on external trade flows are more
readily available than are data on internal exchange flows. Perhaps, nothing better
demonstrates this unfortunate reality than the absence in many African countries of
hard data on the most rudimentary of national statistical figures: the population of the
country.
But which is the cause, and which is the effect? Is it possible that the poverty of
policies on domestic demand issues is itself responsible for the absence of domestic
data? One does not have to resolve this conundrum to recognize that addressing the
one would redound to the benefit of the other. It may not matter where in the circle
one breaks into the chain; what may count is that one does so.
The absence of sustained focus on domestic demand has not always been a
In the 1960s, many African
feature of economic policy-making in Africa.
countries - in consonant with the spirit of those times - engaged in formulating
periodic long-term development plans (usually three-five years in duration). While
arguably influenced by Soviet-style planning theology, most of these plans were
more akin to French-style indicative planning than to the Soviet Union's
comprehensive planning methodology. Put another way, the African plans projected
a desired rate of growth, took account of available resources, estimated how much of
those resources would be available to the public and private sectors, and framed
policies that, at least in theory, would maximize the efficiencies of both sectors in the
utilization of the national resources.
The planning was not necessarily successful (although it may not be entirely
coincidental that Africa witnessed its best decade of growth during the period of such
plans), but it possessed three features that are pertinent to the policy suggestions that
I'm making here. First, it required the government and the society as a whole to take
an inventory of available resources, including the domestic demands of the economy.
Second, long-term economic policies were then formulated against the backdrop of
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the data gathered. Third, those policies were formulated with the recognition that the
promotion of economic growth required contributions by the private sector as well as
by the government, and the domestic sector as much as the external sector.
The argument here is not for a return to long-term national economic planning certainly not of the centralized model. It is possible that the market orientation to
economic growth, which is as much the current theology as soviet-style planning was
a generation ago, renders any such suggestion stillborn. The argument is that means
must be found by which African economies can transcend the difficulty of obtaining
data on internal economic processes, and by which they can give voice to domestic
demands.
D. Taking Account of Domestic Demand and Why It Matters
Because the suggestion that the path to economic growth in Africa may lie in
understanding, encouraging or otherwise managing domestic demand runs counter to
the accepted wisdom that economic growth is to be found in promoting exports and
capital inflows, it is worthwhile to identify the boundaries of the suggestion. At the
outset, I should say that a focus on internal demand is not mutually exclusive with
the encouragement of exports, and there is no necessary reason why the needs of the
domestic market - if properly understood and effectively communicated - should not
attract foreign investment. Put another way, to focus on domestic demand is not to
be xenophobic. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, a focus on domestic demand will
mean dethroning "export-led growth" and foreign direct investment from the
pedestals these high priests of the economic development gospel have typically
occupied. And yet, the reason for doing so is as straightforwardly simple as is the
unlikelihood that it'll be done.
To focus on domestic demand is to focus on those who are doing the
demanding, just as to focus on external supply, by and large, has meant focusing on
external suppliers of goods and capital, and above all on the incentives that drive
their production. A focus on domestic demand brings into relief an all-too frequently
ignored reality of African economies: the clear-cut cleavage that exists between the
"traditional" and "modern" sectors of the economy; between the "educated," and the
"uneducated," the rural and the urban, the primary producer and the secondary
consumer. To focus on domestic demand, then, is to focus on the internal structures
of the society, and to address domestic demand is to deal with the internal structural
flaws and bottlenecks of African societies.
It is commonplace to assert that the most valuable resource a society has is its
citizens, and that the most important investment that it makes is in its people. But
that these are truisms do not depreciate their value for African societies. Yet, the
history of Africa's economic growth during the last generation has been essentially
to undervalue the proportion of national resources that go into core investments in
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the person, particularly in health and in education. The early years of independence
invariably saw politicians making and acting on promises to improve health and
education. International financial assistance to African economies in the 1960s (such
as those made by the World Bank and affiliated agencies, as well as those of rich
country governments) were devoted disproportionately to health and education. The
idea of growth was articulated frequently and measured against such yardsticks as
the number of rural clinics, the availability of universal primary education, the
number of trained nurses and doctors, and the like. To import teachers and doctors
from India, Pakistan, Cuba or Hungary were not seen as national weaknesses. By the
middle to late 1970s, many of these tendencies were in reverse. Growth was being
measured in terms of the number of steel mills under construction, the percentage of
the national product that was being exported, and the amount of foreign direct
investment coming into the country. By the 1980s, educational and health
institutions were in decline, as indeed also were the tonnage of steel being fabricated
on the continent, the export of cash-crops and the inflow of foreign direct
investment. The only thing on the increase was the debt-load - and primarily to
foreign governmental institutions.
It is striking that we rarely connect the decline in health and education to the
decline in capital inflows; and to the extent we do so, we tend to assume that the
former was caused by the latter, not vice-versa. I think the reverse is more accurate.
African economies, if they are to promote sustained economic development, need to
worry more about health and education (and related domestic demand) than it is
customary to assert. I am contending here that health and education are not merely
social concerns about which it is morally and politically correct to be concerned
with, but that they are, as an economic matter essential to regeneration and
reconstruction.
To focus on health and education is to take an inventory of the needs of the
society; more particularly, of the needs of the vast majority of the population whose
activities are responsible for the growth of the national economy. The focus would
call for obtaining better data than we typically have on the health needs of the rural
farmer and pregnant mother-to-be; on the mortality of infants and women during
childbirth; on the number of available classrooms, textbooks and teachers for
primary and secondary education. A shift in focus should, at a minimum, shame the
government and society in addressing the obvious shortfalls that we all know to
exist, and to be growing worse. Preferably, it would compel the entire society to
restructure internal social and economic relationships so that optimal output is
obtained from every member of society.
Africans may (and frequently do) pride themselves on their communitarian
belief systems and practices. One wonders the extent to which we ever pause to
reflect on the internal dynamics of that communitarian ethos, and that in some ways,
it may be inadequate to the task of economic empowerment. Thus, for example,
contemporary African communitarianism is based on privileging the urban
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population and then imposing on it the social obligation of taking care of rural
relatives. At best, this causes dependency on the part of the rural dwellers. It's not
only that they become incapable of making decisions without seeking the approval of
their rich townsfolk, but they may well lose the drive for entrepreneurial initiatives.
But city-dwellers and society at large are not necessarily better off. Many of those
who, by virtue frequently of an accident, find themselves thrust into the role of
breadwinner for what has been termed a "patrimonial" grouping may crack under the
weight of the demands imposed by the role, or may engage in behavior, which,
whole rational for the grouping, is destructive of the interests of society at large.
This is surely one explanation of both petty and high-level corruption in many
African societies. One means of addressing both the dependency of the one, and the
incapacities of the other would be to provide the former practical means by which it
can satisfy its needs.
A focus on domestic demand, if thus properly mounted, should shift attention
from the desires, interests and ideologies of narrowly-based urban-dwelling
postcolonial elites, to spotlight the needs and contributions of the broader society. It
is not coincidental that this broader focus which characterized the early years of
independence also witnessed the period of greatest growth in Africa, nor is it
surprising that the shift away from this broader focus parallels the period of
unrepresentative government in Africa. It may not be possible to show whether the
reorientation of the economic focus caused that shift in representative government,
but it seems evident that the one reinforced the other. One consequence of focusing
on internal demand, then, would be the potential for a closer exploration of the
various linkages that in practice do exist between politics and economics, between
health and prosperity or growth, between demand and production.
It should be obvious that the linkages for which I'm arguing here are not the
usually referenced ones of promoting trans-African trade, nor even that of somehow
blending the traditional into the modem. Africa's economic reconstruction does not
lie in romanticizing some shared "Africanness," nor of myths of past greatness. The
problem of reconstruction is about the here and now, and at heart, it is about
furnishing the living with the tools that will permit them to extract from themselves
value that is in demand by others. In this process, foreign capital can play, at most, a
secondary role. Those linkages, I think, will likely result from policies that invest in
linking society to its inhabitants; policies that despite rhetoric have rarely been
practiced. The reasons for the discordance between rhetoric and reality are not
difficult to gauge.
My suggested approach, of course, will not be an easy one to adopt, let alone
implement. If it were, it would not have taken a generation of persistently foundering
economies to lead to its suggestion. It will be an exceptional elite group that
foregoes the lure and seeming promise of glossy technology for the plodding
prospects of returns in the education and health of the masses. Besides, such
investments demand the infusion of capital, and, of course, capital is always in short
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supply unless the beneficiary of the expenditure is oneself. Hence, it is hardly
surprising that even in the hay-day of postindependent social infrastructural building,
more money was spent on postsecondary education than on primary and secondary
schooling.

The African's approach to modernity has been to promote the capacity of the
individual elite to appropriate as much of the national wealth as possible, in the
belief that tradition would compel the recipient to redistribute the appropriated
wealth to his/her relatives. This is a wrongheaded way of creating linkages.
Whatever may be the African sense of communal coexistence or "communitarian
values," it is not an adequate substitute for society's obligation to encourage and
indeed facilitate the maximization of each individual's specific capacities. In any
event, the entire population of the nation is obliged to adjust to, adapt or otherwise
live in the contemporary world. Linkage is not about accommodating the traditional
to the modem, or vice-versa. Rather, it is about coming to grips with the possibilities
that contemporary society imposes on the limited resources that are available to that
society, and seeking to make the most efficient use of those resources; and to do so
with an eye to the long run.
Further, the prescription requires African societies to think in terms of the long
run returns on their investments, and to overlook short-run costs. For societies
perennially burdened by statistics (if not overwhelmed by the sense) of comparative
underperformance that is asking a lot. Nor is the task going to be made any easier in
the current environment of near-instantaneous telecommunications and increasing
population mobility. Indeed, a truly pesky question is whether, given the size and
persistence of the brain drain from the continent, it is fair to ask the populace at large
not only to maintain, but to increase the amount of society's resources devoted to
education;. Is not such a policy tantamount to using Africa's limited resources to
educate Europe's future engineers and North America's software programmers?
Thus, is the suggestion any more than another instance of a policy that robs the poor
for the benefit of the rich? Looked at solely from the perspective of the short term,
the answer to the question may well be yes. But surely, one of the reasons for the
brain drain is the perception that the African future looks bleak. It is a perception
held not only by the highly educated, but also by the ordinary working man and
woman who, increasingly, constitute the bulk of the migrating work-force out of
Africa. If the economic reconstruction project is to be sustainable, it must address
the needs and demands of this latter group.
The basic defence of the suggestion is that ultimately, it is a focus on domestic
demand that is most likely to assure the sort of structural changes in the economy
that will yield positive results along the lines of the four criteria that I enumerated
early in this talk. The exploitation of natural resources facilitated by imported capital
may provide the illusion of rapid growth when defined in terms of asset
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accumulation; but similar growth, perhaps at a slower clip, can and should be
achieved if the capital that is deployed is that which flows from the exploitation of
domestic human resources. To the extent that such exploitation of resources
command fair returns to the workers and the resource owners, distributive equity also
should follow. But it is with regard to the third and fourth criteria for evaluating
growth that a domestic demand-based regime proves its superiority over the
conventional supply-driven approach which has underpinned proposals for economic
growth in the last generation.
Perhaps the most critical flaw in Africa's economic growth has been to rely on
physical natural resources (whether agricultural or mineral) as the backbone to such
growth. The consequence has been to relegate the human resource to the secondary
role of tilling land, digging mines or pushing paper. A focus on demand opens up
the possibilities of growth that is limited only by the human capacity to imagine. Of
course, that imagination will be tamed and controlled by the physical realities of
environmental constraints. But even while operating within such constraints,
pluralism should reign where it is the need to satisfy the demands of the population
rather than the need of maximizing physical assets that dictate economic policies.
The result is less likely to be a monocultural economy. This is so because a demandbased economic structure would strive to satisfy the varied wants of the population,
not merely to exploit those natural resources that are in abundance.
That is not to say that there will be no failures or hardships. A demand-driven
economy will generate its own booms and busts, and policy-makers will
misunderstand and miscalculate both the nature and amount of demand, as well as
the optimal means of satisfying those demands. But because pluralism entails
multiple decision-making centers, the experiencing of such miscalculations are
unlikely to be fatally self-reinforcing. In the first place, they should generate selfcorrecting flexibility within the economic system.
Whatever may be the shortcomings of orthodox classical economics, one of its
lasting contributions is what it has taught humanity about the interactive relationship
of demand and signaling mechanisms such as price. With misplaced paternalism,
African governments have not only failed to focus on demand, but they have often
operated under the illusion that they have the capacity to control price. The results
have been that rather than more or less gradual adjustments of demand to price and
vice-versa, African economies frequently have witnessed dramatic and disruptive
variations in efforts to suppress first the one and then to react helplessly to its
consequences on the other. Booms and busts are therefore not unknown, but because
they tend to have been the results of quixotic efforts at control, they generally have
not led to the creation of internal equilibrating mechanisms.
It is the
institutionalization of such mechanisms that ultimately distinguish self-sustaining
mature economies from weak ones. It is that confidence in the ability of internal
institutions to remedy fluctuations in demand that distinguishes such otherwise
comparable economies as Australia and New Zealand from Brazil and Argentina.
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The latter pair of countries invariably turn to the IMF to stabilize such fluctuations,
while the former pair typically rely on internal equilibriating institutions to smooth
out those fluctuations. That is not to suggest that external capital is irrelevant to
either pair of countries; but that in the one, external capital is simply an adjunct of
domestic savings and domestic demand, in the other, it is separate and alien.
Sustainable economic reconstruction requires that the source of capital is fused into
the demand for it.
And so, I conclude that the path to economic reconstruction, contrary to the
standard gospel, lies less in export-led growth nor in the attraction of foreign
investment capital, as in understanding and paying attention to domestic demand.
Such a reorientation of perspective will not be easy, nor will the results necessarily
be immediate, but the route to economic growth measured in terms of asset
accumulation, equity in its distribution, diversity in production, and self-sustaining
economic performance lies along this road.
III. WHAT'S LAW GOT TO Do WITH IT
"The rule of law" is now a familiar buzz phrase that is inserted in every
discussion as to what purportedly ails the non-Western world. Almost never do
those who employ the phrase pause to provide the listener or reader with its meaning,
and I daresay that it is probably the case that most of those who use the term have at
best a fuzzy understanding of what they intend to convey through the phrase, let
alone what the hearer or reader will understand it to mean. Yet, the idea that there is
(or must be) some connection between law (or a legal system) and economic
performance has been the subject of systematic study and discourse since at least the
works of Karl Marx and Max Weber. And without suggesting that there are
conclusive answers to the questions raised by implying the existence of such
connections, it might be worth examining what relevance law has to the
implementation of my suggested alternative course to economic reconstruction, and
indeed what effect adoption of the suggested course might have on the development
of law in Africa.
Under the foreign trade/investment centered regime of economic growth, the
"rule of law" concept has tended to be framed along three dimensions: First, there is
a tendency to prescribe specific substantive rules as being essential to encourage
capital inflows. Thus, for example, domestic laws and international treaties should
explicitly adopt friendly labor, immigration, foreign exchange and tax rules. Further,
it would be advisable that such laws provide for the national treatment (or better)
with regard to the protections afforded foreign investors, including the renunciation
of the right of the state to expropriate or "nationalize" foreign property. Second,
administrative rules and practice should more or less be transparent; that is, the text
of the rules should be easily obtainable, and the practices standardized. The rules
and practices should be readily accessible to outsiders, consistently adhered to, and
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free of arbitrary or capricious enforcement. Third, the laws and their administrative
enforcement must be subject to independent review and, if necessary, to being
overruled, by an impartial adjudicatory tribunal.
These teachings of a "rule of law" regime are clearly relevant for a domestic
demand-based orientation to economic growth. Without question, the last two
features can have as much resonance for the approach that I've suggested in this talk
as they do for the approach whose relative de-emphasis I've advocated. I think,
however, that adoption of my perspective on economic growth should result in a
reexamination of the substantive elements of the law. To the extent that laws operate
both to provide incentives for promoting optimally acceptable normative behavior
and to discourage socially unacceptable conduct, the substantive elements of the law
will align internally-fostered economic growth with their optimal social institutions.
If the result is that law operates on the individual not as an alien force, but as a
regular presence, then, there would indeed be the rule of law. Concepts like
"corruption," will be defined less as ideal abstractions, and more as operational terms
that are responsive to the living environment of the society under regulation.

IV. CONCLUSION

I've sought in this talk to present an admittedly ambitious program of
economic reconstruction. I do not think that Africa has lacked programs of
reconstruction. To the contrary, it has had too many of them. But they've all
shared a singular focus that visualizes economic growth as the art of
increasing production for export, and of doing so within a relatively narrow
time-frame. What I've suggested here is that an alternative path should be
explored. It is a path that would require policy-makers to gauge the life
needs of the ordinary population. Intuitive as this approach might seem, it is
not one that African governments in fact have followed. Nor will it be an
easy one to adopt. Following it will require maintaining a sustained
attention span on policies whose results will not be immediately accretionary
to asset accumulation. However, unless African governments give practical
effect to the usually articulated credo that natural persons are the ultimate
assets of a nation, arriving at a happy destination in the quest for economic
reconstruction will be a perennially elusive one.

